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Abstract3 
The aim of the paper is to determine whether Tunisian Islamic and conventional banks are 
distinguishable from one another [on the basis of financial characteristics, in particular, 
profitability, liquidity, credit, insolvency risks] during 2005-2014 for a sample contains 16 
banks (14 conventional and 2 Islamic).The comparison analysis between interest-free banks 
(IBs) and conventional banks (CBs) of bank specific factors reveals that there are differences 
between Islamic and conventional banks behaviour. Regression based Comparison analysis 
show that Interest-free banks are more profitable, more capitalized, more liquid and more stable 
but more riskier and less solvent than CBs. Large IBs are more profitable, more capitalized and 
riskier than small IBs. Small IBs have also lower Z-score than Large IBs. We conclude that the 
stability of IBs is attributed to size effect (Large IBs). Moreover, the stability of large IBs is 
driven by higher capitalization and liquidity. Across Tunisian banks, Zitouna bank is more 
stable while AL Baraka bank is riskier and more solvent. We find also that post Tunisian 
Revolution, there is no significant difference in terms of stability between IBs and CBs. 
However over the study period, IBs have lower insolvency risk and tend to be more capitalized 
and stable than CBs. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Many countries currently experience a dual banking system where Islamic banks 
operate side by side with conventional banks. The first country which enjoyed a 
dual banking system is the United Arab Emirates where the Dubai Islamic Bank 
was established in 1973. The creation of the Dubai Islamic Bank was followed by 
the establishment of a large number of banks operating in various parts of the 
world on the same Islamic principles. In the last two decades, the number of 
Islamic banks significantly increased and their geographical spread has grown 
exponentially to cover all continents, especially in GCC countries and South Asia 
(Toumi, Viviani, & Belkacem, 2010).  
According to (Global Islamic Finance Report, 2010), there are 614 registered 
Islamic financial institutions operating in 47 countries worldwide.  
Our focus in this paper will be on Tunisia, country where the Islamic banking 
landscape consists of four Islamic banks offering only Islamic products. The first 
one is Al Baraka Bank Tunisia” established in 1983 after receiving an offshore 
banking license. The second one and the most developed is “Zitouna Bank” 
established in October 2009, “Zitouna Bank” is a universal commercial bank, 
which implements the laws governing banking in Tunisia. The third is a regional 
office “Noor Islamic Bank”. It is a representative office from a financial 
institution based in Dubai. The fourth is Wifak bank created in 2015 following 
the transformation of the company “El Wifack Leasing” into a universal bank 
specialized in Islamic banking operations whose activity is governed by Law No. 
2001-65 of 10 July 2001 on credit institutions. It is worth to note that since data 
are not available or are only partially available for Noor and Wifak banks, we 
consider the two major Islamic banks Zitouna and Al Baraka banks for empirical 
analysis. 
IBs have the same functions of their conventional counterparts even if the nature 
and structure of their products are completely different. It is not allowed for IBs 
to be involved in transactions based on interest (Riba), uncertainty (Gharar) and 
speculations/gambling (Qimar). The basic difference between Islamic and 
conventional banks is that the former is based on profit and loss sharing mode of 
financing, at least on the liability side of their balance sheet (Obaidullah, 2005). 
Our study investigates the differences between interest-free (Islamic) and 
conventional banks in terms of financial characteristics. 11 hypothesis will be 
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investigated. The first one is about profitability, the second is about liquidity, the 
third deals with insolvency risk, the forth is about stability, the fifth is about 
capitalization, the sixth tests the impact of 2008 GFC on IB, the seventh 
investigates the effect of 2011 Tunisian revolution on IBs, the eighth and ninth 
are about Islamic and conventional banks size, the tenth is about share market and 
the eleventh deals with the differences between Zitouna banks and Al Baraka 
bank. 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on interest-free finance by 
investigating the feature of interest-free (IB) and conventional banks (CB) using 
a sample of 16 banks (14 conventional and 2 Islamic) from Tunisia over the period 
2005–2014. OLS technique is considered to run several linear regression models.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follow: Section II presents the literature 
review and hypotheses Development. Section III describes data and variables. The 
regression based Comparisons analysis is the subject of section IV. Section V 
concludes the paper. 
II. Literature review and Hypothesis Development  
 
In view of the rapid growth of Islamic banking, recent researches have examined 
and compared different aspects (profitability, liquidity, risk, etc.) of this banks 
and conventional ones using financial ratios ( (Metwally, 1997); (Samad & 
Hassan, 2000); (Iqbal, 2001); (Hassoune, 2002); (Rosly & Bakar, 2003); (Samad, 
2004); (Ahmad & Hassan, 2007); (Kader, Asarpota, & Al-Maghaireh, 2007); 
(Olson & Zoubi, 2008); (Srairi, 2010) (Khan, Ahmad, Ur Rahman, & Haleem, 
2018)).   
 
Our first hypothesis is about bank profitability. We use the return on assets 
(ROA) and the return on equity (ROE) as proxies for bank profitability. 
The majority of previous studies report that IBs achieve higher records of 
profitability compared to conventional banks. (Samad & Hassan, 2000) reported 
that IBs outperform conventional banks in Malaysia. (Hassoune, 2002) showed 
also that IBs are more profitable than conventional ones with the same balance 
sheet structure. (Iqbal, 2001) found that IBs are doing fairly well compared to a 
benchmark sample of CBs. (Karim & Ali, 1989) and (Rosly & Abu Bakar, 2003) 
suggested that GCC IBs may be more profitable than other GCC banks. However, 
it may be possible that shareholders in IBs are willing to accept a lower return on 
equity. (Karim & Ali, 1989, p. 193) stated that IBs “opt for an increase in 
investment deposits rather than equity capital to fund their investments” under 
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conditions of “high strategic choice”. During the financial boom experienced in 
the GCC in recent years, it makes sense for IBs to rely more upon deposits than 
equity.  
 
(Olson & Zoubi, 2008) confirmed that IBs in GCC countries are more profitable 
and therefore reward shareholders with higher returns than CBs. However, they 
argue that the profit sharing principle of the saving deposits depends on future 
profits but the expected returns are similar to those of conventional saving 
deposits of the same maturity. 
 
(Metwally, 1997) and (Ahmad & Hassan, 2007) reported different results. 
(Metwally, 1997) found that IBs do not seem to differ much in terms of the ratios 
of gross income to assets and the return on deposits. Both IBs and CBs offer their 
depositors similar returns. (Ahmad & Hassan, 2007) showed also that both types 
of banks have almost similar return on equity and return on asset in Bangladesh. 
Hence, we formulate our first hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1: IBs are more profitable than CBs. 
Our second hypothesis is about liquidity. We use liquidity ratios cash to assets 
ratio and the cash to deposits ratio (CTA and CTD), as proxies for liquidity. 
 
There is general consensus among the scholars that IBs usually have excessive 
liquidity due to inadequate investment opportunities (Basu, Prasad, & Rodriguez, 
2015). On the liability side of the balance sheet, IBs receive deposits based on 
profit & loss sharing (PLS) on which they have to pay profit. On the other hand, 
they invest those funds on the asset side. Due to limited investment opportunities, 
they have high liquid assets so liquidity risk is very low. Therefore, IBs expose 
themselves to credit risk by extending loans through Murabaha and Ijarah in 
order to generate more profits, but the overall default risk would still be in control. 
It is not necessary that a bank with low liquidity/credit risk controls both risk 
together as it reflects a very limited overall risk of instability (Imbierowicz & 
Rauch, 2014). Hence, we formulate our second hypothesis as follows: 
 
H2: IBs hold higher liquidity than CBs. 
Our third hypothesis is about credit and insolvency risks. We use six 
indicators : 4 of credit risk [the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans  (LLR), 
Non-performing loans to gross loans (NPL), Loans to assets (LTA) and Loans to 
deposits (LTD)] and 2 for insolvency risk [Deposits to assets (DTA) and Z-score]. 
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(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013) compared the business orientation, 
efficiency and stability of conventional and Islamic banks, with the mean Z-scores 
showing that IBs had significantly lower credit risk. However, when other factors 
were controlled, most of the results showed no significant difference between the 
two banking systems. Later, (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013) used 
NPL as a proxy for asset quality, and found that the NPLs of IBs were consistently 
lower value, suggesting lower credit risk in IBs.  
(Boumediene, 2011), assessing credit risk in IBs using Merton’s DD, concluded 
that IBs had relatively lower credit risk along with a lower probability of default. 
 
In practice, IBs have shown a strong preference for fixed return modes of financing 
which are less risky. According to (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013), in a typical IB, more 
than 80% of total assets are fixed income and short term maturity assets. While, 
only 20% are dedicated to long term and risk sharing investments. (El-Hawary, 
Grais, & Iqbal, 2007) and (Greuning & Iqbal, 2008) claimed that the dominance 
of less risky, low return assets deprives the bank of the benefits of portfolio 
diversification, as Mudarabah and Mushrakah contracts are more profitable. 
Analysts explain this behaviour by the fact that sale-based transactions are less 
associated with moral hazard and adverse selection problems than PLS 
investments (Siddiqi, 2006). In fact, the latter need additional effort to capture 
good investment opportunities and to analyse projects adequately. Besides, IBs 
cannot request for collateral to reduce credit risk. Thus, risk sharing investments 
require a high level of confidence and transparency between investors, banks and 
depositors. Hence, our next hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3 : IBs are less risky than CBs. 
Our forth hypothesis is about stability. The research employs the Z-score variable 
for comparison of stability between the both types of banking.  
Following seminal work by (Čihák & Hesse, 2010), several other studies ( 
(Gamaginta & Rokhim, 2011); (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013); (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013)) compared the relative stability of Islamic 
and conventional banks in different periods and across different countries. Some 
of this literature concluded that IBs are more stable while others find no evidence 
of differences in credit risk across the alternative banking systems. 
 
(Čihák & Hesse, 2010) analyzed the financial stability of 19 banking systems, the 
sample being composed of 77 Islamic and 397 conventional banks between 1993 
and 2004. The authors found that Small IBs tend to be more financially stable than 
Small CBs; Large CBs tend to be more financially stable than Large IBs; and the 
Small IBs tend to be more financially stable than the Large CBs. It also showed 
6 
 
 
that IBs are more exposed to difficulties in management and the increase of the 
market share of Islamic banking has no significant influence on the stability of 
other banks. The more IBs grow, the less stable they tend to become. 
According to (Imam & Kpodar, 2010), the finding of (Čihák & Hesse, 2010) 
which stated that IBs tend to be less stable when operating at large scale shows 
that under certain conditions, the growing Islamic banking sector may not be 
beneficial for economic growth because it can weaken financial stability, 
especially in countries with lack of prudential regulations. Moreover, Imam and 
(Imam & Kpodar, 2010) argued that Islamic banking is more considered as a 
complement to the existing conventional banking and thereby help diversify the 
systemic risk. 
 
(Gamaginta & Rokhim, 2011) analysed the stability of 12 Islamic banks and 71 
conventional banks in Indonesia using during the period 2004-2009. The 
empirical results indicate that the stability of Islamic banks is generally lower than 
that of CBs except during the crisis period of 2008-2009 where the two categories 
of banks tended to have the same relatively degree of stability. They also found 
that Small IBs have the same level of stability as Small CBs. 
 
(Rajhi & Hassairi, 2014) analyzed financial stability for 16 countries including 
ten countries in the MENA region and six countries in Southeast Asia, for a total 
of 467 conventional banks and 90 IBs between 2000 and 2008. Empirical results 
showed that the average levels of the stability of IBs measured by the proxy Z-
scores are higher than CBs except for small IBs. These results are in contradiction 
with the results found by (Čihák & Hesse, 2010). The latter also show that credit 
risk and income diversity are the main reasons for the insolvency of IBs. 
More research is needed to determine whether IBs can help contribute to establish 
a climate of financial stability. Hence, the fourth hypothesis to be tested is: 
H4: IBs are less stable than CBs. 
(Alkassim, 2005) investigated using the Ordinary Least Square ( OLS ) whether 
or not a bank’s internal characteristics may explain the difference in profitability 
between Islamic and conventional banks in the GCC over the period 1997-2004. 
The results indicate that CBs were less profitable than IBs, and higher capital 
ratios favored IBs profitability. 
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(Beck, Asli, & Merrouche, 2010) compared the two types of banking and their 
performance across many countries, during recent crisis and conclude that though 
both types of banking were affected by the crisis, IBs had higher capitalization 
coupled with higher liquidity reserves, resulted in better performance of IBs. 
(Parashar & Venkatesh, 2010) compared using ratio analysis conventional and 
Islamic banks performance in the GCC before and during the recent global 
financial crisis, and find that over the four-year period analysis from 2006 to 2009, 
IBs performed better than CBs in respect of profitability as indicated by higher 
average return on total assets and equity, and were higher capitalized as indicated 
by higher CAR ratio and higher equity to total assets ratio. Hence, the fifth 
hypothesis could be formulated as: 
H5 : IBs are more capitalized than CBs. 
After subprime financial crisis, IBs got the attention of the academics and scholars 
to investigate performance, stability and risk management practices in order to 
check differences with conventional financial system ( (Čihák & Hesse, 2010); 
(Hasan & Dridi, 2010); (bedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013); (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013); (Kabir, Worthington, & Gupta, 2015)) and this stream 
of literature found Islamic banks to have lower credit risk, better asset quality and 
more stable as compare to CBs. 
(Hasan & Dridi, 2010) examined the impact of the crisis on the profitability, credit 
and asset growth, and external ratings of 120 Islamic and conventional banks in 
eight countries covering the period (2007−2010) and document that IBs have been 
affected differently than CBs. They find that factors related to IBs, business model 
helped limit the adverse impact on profitability in 2008, while weaknesses in risk 
management practices in some IBs led to a larger decline in profitability in 2009 
compared to CBs. Furthermore, the paper reveals that IBs‟ credit and asset growth 
rates were higher than that of CBs in 2008–2009, contributing to financial and 
economic stability and that external rating agencies, re-assessment of IBs, risk 
was generally more favorable. 
However, (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013) investigated stability during the 2007–2008 
financial crisis using Z-scores (covering a matched sample of 34 IBs (IBs) and 34 
CBs (CBs) from 16 countries), but found no significant difference. The finding 
reveals that IBs are diverging from their theoretical business model which would 
have allowed them to keep the same level of soundness even during the crisis. 
Hence, we formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
H6: IBs are affected by 2008 GFC. 
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Despite the potential and the strong internal demand, the successive Tunisian 
governments before January 2011 did not try to neither push forward nor promote 
the Islamic finance products among the population. For pure ideological reasons, 
the political authorities saw Islamic banking with suspicion before January 2011, 
because of its possible association with banned political parties (Beji, 2015). 
 
The situation changed after January 2011, and an Islamic finance regulatory 
system which covers Sukuk issuance, insurance, banking, leasing and even Zakat 
and Wakf was discussed to be adopted by the Parliament by the end of 2012. 
The government approved a Sukuk law in October 2014 to diversify the 
government’s financing sources and to have an access to Islamic capital markets. 
In July 2014, the National Constituent Assembly adopted a draft law regulating 
the insurance activities which facilitate the creation of Takaful legislative 
framework. During 2015, a common draft law for both Islamic and conventional 
banks and financial institutions was issued. Though both of them are continuing 
to operate under the same regulation, the first contracts with operations of Islamic 
finance have been defined. Furthermore, issues on banking establishment, 
operations, guarantee mechanism and depositor assets were discussed for the first 
time in a specific chapter within the mentioned draft law. Hence, we formulate 
our hypothesis as follows: 
 
H7 : IBs are affected by 2011 TUN revolution. 
(Čihák & Hesse, 2010) examined financial stability using Z-scores across Islamic 
and conventional banks in 20 countries over the period 1994–2004, classifying 
the banks as small or large. They present evidence that small Islamic banks tend 
to be financially stable than larger Islamic banks and small commercial banks, 
whereas large conventional banks were found to be stronger than large Islamic 
banks. These results show that as Islamic banks grow, risk management becomes 
more difficult, and this was because the credit risk monitoring systems in Islamic 
banks became more complex when operated on a larger scale. 
 
(bedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013) compared the credit and insolvency risk of 
553 banks from 24 countries between 1999 and 2009, employing three different 
accounting ratios to measure credit risk and several forms of the Z-score to 
measure insolvency risk. Similar to (Čihák & Hesse, 2010), they found that small 
Islamic banks were more stable than conventional banks. Hence, we formulate 
our hypotheses as follows: 
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H8 : Small IBs have different evolution than Large IBs. 
H9 : Small CBs have different evolution than Large CBs. 
(Beck, Asli, & Merrouche, 2010) argued that CBs that operate in countries with 
a higher market share of IBs are more cost-effective but less stable. 
(Čihák & Hesse, 2010) provided also a cross –country empirical evidence on the 
role of IBs in financial stability in 18 banking system and find that the market 
share of IBs does not have significant impact on the financial strength of other 
banks. They further find that the bank's size has a bearing on its financial strength. 
Hence, we formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
H10: High Share market IBs have different evolution than CBs 
Established in 1983 with an offshore banking licence, “BEST Bank” was allowed 
to conduct onshore banking activities in 1985 thank to an amendment to offshore 
legislation. Although, the bank should not hold deposits more than 1% of the total 
banking deposits. In 1999, “Bayt Al Tamwil El Saoudi Al Tounsi for Lease” was 
created as the first Islamic leasing company known as “BEST Lease”. In January 
1st 2010, the bank was renamed “Al Baraka Bank Tunisia” and in 2011, it 
submitted its application to become a resident bank in order to provide services to 
local customers. In 2013, “Al Baraka Bank Tunisia” became the 22nd resident 
bank forming the Tunisian banking system. “Al Baraka Bank Tunisia” is a 
subsidiary of “Al Baraka Banking Group” based in Bahrain which owns 80% of 
its capital. The remaining 20% are owned by the Tunisian State. In the mid-1980s, 
“Al Baraka Bank” played a key role in financing, via Musharaka technique, one 
of the most important real estate projects in Tunisia: “The Planning of Lac de 
Tunis” (Chaabouni & Ghanoudi, 2013). 
Since 2014, the bank has launched a set of new financing and deposit products 
including student financing and study accounts. In the same year, the bank opened 
five new branches including three exchange offices. In 2013, the year of its 
conversion to a resident bank, “Al Baraka Bank” increased its financings and 
investment portfolios by 7% to reach US$ 599 million. This result is achieved 
thank to a rise by 24% to its Murabaha sales to reach US$ 287 million. The bank 
total assets stood at US$ 643 million at the end of 2014. 
With a paid capital of US$ 30 million, “Zitouna Bank” was founded by the 
President’s Ben Ali son in law in May 2009 and opened to public in May 2010. 
The second Islamic bank “Zitouna” is a domestic retail bank targeting the local 
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market. Mobilizing the classic Islamic finance techniques such as Murabaha, 
Mudaraba and Ijara the bank provides funding to real estate, equipment and 
tourist facilities (African Development Bank, 2011).  
In 2012 and after the Revolution of January 2011, the Tunisian government took 
the control and the direction of the bank. In order to facilitate exchange of 
expertises and to improve the microfinancing techniques and know-how, the bank 
signed in April 2014 an agreement with Sub-Saharan Islamic banks (Guinea, 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Sudan) (Thomson Reuters and Zawya, 2013). 
Hence, we formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
 
H11 : Zitouna bank has different evolution than Al Baraka bank. 
 
III. Data and variables  
 
Our sample contains 16 banks (14 conventional and 2 Islamic). List of tunisian 
banks is given at Appendice, see  Table A 1 . We have 160 observations, or bank-
years of data, for banks operating in Tunisia for the calendar years 2005–2014. 
There are 140 observations for conventional banks (CBs) and 20 observations for 
Islamic banks (IBs). 12 financial ratios are used in this study. All are defined in 
Table 1. we classify these ratios into six general categories: profitability ratios 
(ROA, and ROE), liquidity ratios (CTA, and CTD),4 credit risk (LLR, NPL, 
LTA, LTD), insolvency risk ( DTA), Reglementary risk (CAP), and asset 
structure ratios (FAA, OBSIA).5 To ensure that our results were not driven by 
the presence of some outliers, we do correct all variables (we did not eliminate 
extreme values).6 Definition of each ratio is given at Table 1. 
For stability ratio measure, Z-score will be computed based on the formula 
presented by (Groeneveld & de Vries, 2009). In order to compute this score, they 
took into account the following indicators: ROA (return on assets), Equity to 
                                                          
4 Liquidity means how quickly a bank can convert its assets into cash at face value to meet the 
cash demands of the depositors and borrowers.  
5
 Regarding the later ratios, we use fixed assets to assets ratio, and off-balance sheet items to 
assets ratio to account for the operating leverage, and off-balance sheet activities, respectively. 
These ratios are used in the previous empirical banking literature (see, (Srairi, 2010) and (Ben 
Khediri, Charfeddined, & Ben Youssef, 2015)). 
6
 To control for the remaining outliers, we’ll use a robust estimation technique (an alternative 
method) as a superior estimation method, less sensitive to outliers, proposed by (Rousseeuw, 
Hampel, Ronchetti, & Stahel, 1986).  
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Assets ratio (ETA) and the standard deviation of ROA. Z-score is computed using 
the following formula: 𝑍it = ROAit+(EQ/TA)itσROA  ,   where the subscripts ‘i’ and ‘t’ 
represent individual banks and time period, respectively. As (Mercieca, Schaeck, 
& Wolfe, 2007)  stated, the higher the Z-score, the more stable it is the bank. 
 
Table 1: Definition of variables and expected signs for Z-score.7 
Ratios Definitions  
Profitability    
ROA Return on assets = Net income/Total assets  
ROE Return on equity = Net income/Stockholders’ equity  
Liquidity   
CTA Cash to assets = Cash/Total assets  
CTD Cash to deposits = Cash/Total customer deposits  
Credit risk   
LLR Loans loss reserves to gross loans  
NPL Non-performing loans to gross loans  
LTA Loans to assets = Loans/Total assets  
LTD Loans to deposits = Loans/Total customer deposits  
Regulatory risk   
CAP Capital adequaty ratio  
Insolvency risk    
DTA Deposits to assets = Deposits/Total assets  
Asset structure   
FAA Fixed assets to assets = Fixed assets/Total assets  
OBSIA Off-balance sheet items to assets = Off-balance sheet 
items/Total assets 
 
Dummies    
IB Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is Islamic, 0 
otherwise (i.e. Conventional banks (CB)) 
 
D2011 Dummy variable equal to 1 if year ≥ 2011  
D2008 Dummy variable equal to 1 if year ≥ 2008  
Bank caracteristics   
Size Log(Total asset)  
FAA    
OBSIA    
Market share percentage of comparison between Islamic banks total 
asset and banks.8  
 
                                                          
7
 (Ben Khediri, Charfeddined, & Ben Youssef, 2015). 
8
 Market share=Islamic bank total assets /Country banks total assets x 100%  
 See (Purboastuti, Anwar, & Suryahani, 2015) and (Aminah, Soewito, & Khairudin, 2019). 
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IV. Regression based Comparisons analysis 
 
Different regression models are considered in this section. First, we Compare 
interest-free and CB controlling for bank characteristics. Second, we Compare IB 
and CB cross different Size groups. Third, we do analyse cross countries 
difference. Forth, we take account of Market share side for each type of banks.  
Fifth, we consider the effect of  the Tunisian revolution 2011. 
 
1. Controlling for Bank characteristics. 
 
To assess differences in Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and 
stability across different bank types, we run the following regression: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜸𝑰𝑩𝒊 + 𝜇𝑡𝑌𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝐵𝑖 + 𝜹 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋𝐷2008 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is vector of Bank caracteristics,  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = (AGE𝑖,𝑡 , Size𝑖,𝑡, Growth𝑖,𝑡, 𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡, OBSIA𝑖,𝑡)’, 
where 
Age = Number of years since the bank was incorporated, 
Size = Log(Total asset), 
Growth = Log(Total assets) - Log(Total assets
-1), 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and 
stability of bank i, in year t, 𝐵𝑖 are Bank-fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡 are year-fixed effects, 𝐼𝐵𝑖 is a dummy taking the value one for interest-free banks, 𝐷2008 is a dummy 
variable for GFC (taking the value one from year > 2008), and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
We thus compare IB and CB.   
Taking account of bank characteristics, Table 2 (see Appendix) gives the 
difference of effect of marginal effect of each variable on IBs vs CBs. All 
considered variables have significant difference effect except LLR. ROA, CTA, 
LTA, LTD, NPL, CAP, DTA, and Z-score have positive effects while ROE and 
CTD have negative effects.  
The results in Table 2 show that within banks and years, IBs have higher Return 
on assets (ROA) ratios but lower Return on equity (ROE) ratios (significant at the 
1% level). Hence, IBs are more profitable than CBs which confirm the first 
hypothesis.  This result is in line with results of (Samad & Hassan, 2000), (Samad, 
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2004) and (Olson & Zoubi, 2008). However, it may be possible that shareholders 
in IBs are willing to accept a lower ROE (Karim & Ali, 1989). The results also 
show that within banks and years, IBs have higher Cash to assets (CTA) ratios, 
but lower Cash to deposits (CTD) ratios, a coefficient estimate, however, that is 
significant only at the 10%, as is the difference in Non-performing loans to gross 
loans (NPL). We conclude that IB’s asset is more liquid than those of CB’s as 
represented by CTA. This result confirms the second hypothesis. The finding is 
consistent with (Basu, Prasad, & Rodriguez, 2015).Whereas, CB has the better 
CTD ratio which means, CB asset contains more cash than its customer deposit 
compared to IB. We find also that IBs have 23% point higher Loans to assets 
(LTA) and 19% point higher Loans to deposits (LTD) (significant at the 1% 
level), 31% point higher Loans loss reserves to gross loans (LLR) while there is 
no significant difference. This result suggests that IBs carry higher credit risk 
compared to CBs. Hence, the third hypothesis is not confirmed. This result is not 
in line with finding of (Boumediene, 2011) and (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Merrouche, 2013). An explanation for this may be that “It is not permitted to 
stipulate any finanancial compensation, either in cash or in other consideration, 
as a penalty clause in respect of a delay by a debtor in settling his debt” (AAOIFI 
Shariah Standard No. 3).9 Islamic scholars have differentiated two types of 
defaulters; those who are really in distressed situations (genuine insolvent 
debtors) and those who able to pay but refuse to meet their obligation 
(procrastinating solvent debtors). Whilst Shariah encourages the creditor to give 
leniency to the former, it allows for the punishments to be imposed on the latter. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to the practice, it is hard for IB to determine (without 
really looking at the details of the situations) whether the default arises from a 
genuine reason or otherwise (Hasan A. , 2013). The debtors would pay the CB 
first to avoid any late payment interest and would delay the payments to IB as 
long as they could, given that there is no punitive measures imposed on them by 
the IB. This indicates that the IBs should be able to manage credit supply by not 
excessively lending to risky sectors, which will only increase the credit risk 
exposures. We also find that IBs have higher Deposits to assets (DTA) ratios. This 
                                                          
9 AAOIFI Standard N° 3– Default in Payment by a Debtor: The purpose of this standard is 
to explain the Shari’a rulings applicable to the transactions of Islamic Financial Institutions 
relating to delay on the part of solvent debtors in settling their debts, delay on the part of 
guarantors and contractors in fulfilling their obligations, and the ruling on the matter of penalty 
clauses. ». 
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result shows a lower insolvency risk in CBs. We also find that IBs have higher 
Z-score (significant at the 1% level) than CBs revealing that the former are more 
stable than the latter. Hence, the fourth hypothesis is not confirmed. (Abedifar, 
Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013); (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013); (Miah 
& Uddin, 2017); and (Rajhi & Hassairi, 2014) suggest the same result. However, 
this result is in contradiction with finding of (Čihák & Hesse, 2010) and 
(Gamaginta & Rokhim, 2011). We also find that IBs have higher Capital 
adequacy ratios (CAP) which confirm the fifth hypothesis stipulating that IBs are 
more capitalized than CBs. This result is in line with those reported by (Alkassim, 
2005), (Beck, Asli, & Merrouche, 2010) and (Parashar & Venkatesh, 2010). 
 
2. Cross different Size 
 
Now, we split the sample of all banks according to their asset Size. Specifically, 
we split the sample into banks above the 50th percentile (Large banks) and banks 
below the 50th percentile (Small banks). We therefore run the following 
regressions: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜶 𝐒𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐥_𝐈𝐁𝒊 + 𝜹 𝐒𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐥_𝐂𝐁𝒊 + 𝜇𝑡𝑌𝑡 + 𝜇iB𝑖 + 𝜹 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋 𝐷2008 + 𝑢i𝑡   (2) 
where Small_IB is an Inetraction term between small bank and IB (a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if IB is Small, 0 otherwise), and Small_CB is an Inetraction 
term between small bank and CB (a dummy variable equal to 1 if CB is Small, 0 
otherwise), 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, 
Insolvency, and stability of bank i, in year t, 𝐵𝑖 are Bank-fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡 are 
year-fixed effects, 𝐷2008 is a dummy variable for GFC (taking the value one 
from year > 2008), and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
The results in  Table 3 (see Appendix) shows that there are significant differences 
between Islamic banks of different sizes and that many of the findings so far on 
differences between Islamic and conventional banks are driven by smaller Islamic 
banks. Here we split the sample of Islamic banks according to their asset size. 
Specifically, we split the sample into banks above the 50th percentile and banks 
below the 50th percentile. 
 
Table 3 say that Small IBs have lower Return on equity (ROA) but higher Return 
on equity (ROE). Hence, Large IB are more profitable than small IB However, 
it may be possible that shareholders in Large IB are more willing to accept a lower 
ROE. The results provide also evidence that Small IBs have lower Cash to assets 
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(CTA) ratios but higher Cash to deposits (CTD) (significant at the 10% level) 
indicating that Large IB’s asset is more liquid than those of Small IB. However, 
Small IB’asset contains more cash than its customer deposit compared to Large 
IB. We also find that Small IBs have a lower Capital adequacy ratios suggesting 
that Large IBs are more capitalized. Small IBs have lower Loans to assets 
(LTA) ratios and Loans to deposits (LTD) ratios (significant at the 1% level), 
lower Loans loss reserves to gross loans (LLR) while there is no significant 
difference. This result suggests that Large IBs are riskier than Small IB. We 
also find that Small IBs have lower Z-score than Large IBs. This result is not 
in line with those reported by (Čihák & Hesse, 2010) and (bedifar, Molyneux, & 
Tarazi, 2013). The comparative analysis allows us to conclusively confirm the 
hypothesis that Small IBs have different evolution than Large IBs. 
 
We conclude that the stability of IBs can be attributed to size effect (Large 
IBs). Moreover, the stability of large IBs is driven by higher capitalization 
and liquidity. 
Table 3 show also that Small CBs have higher Return on assets (ROA) and lower 
Return on equity (ROE). The difference is significant at the 1% level. Hence, 
Small CBs are more profitable than Large CBs. However, it may be possible 
that shareholders in Small CB are more willing to accept a lower ROE. 
The results provide also evidence that Small CBs have higher (CTA) ratios, lower 
Cash to deposits (CTD) while there are no significant differences. Small CB’s 
asset is more liquid than those of Large CB. However, Small CB’asset contains 
less cash than its customer deposit compared to Large CB. Contrary to Small IB, 
Small CBs have higher Loans to assets (LTA) ratios, higher Loans to deposits 
(LTD) ratios, higher Loans loss reserves to gross loans (LLR) and higher Non-
performing loans to gross loans (NPL). This result suggests that Small CBs are 
riskier than Large CBs. This result shows that as CBs grow, risk management 
becomes more difficult. The credit risk monitoring systems in CBs became more 
complex when operated on a larger scale. We also find that Small CBs have higher 
Deposits to assets (DTA) ratios. This result reveals lower insolvency risk in 
Large CBs. Moreover, Small CBs have higher Capital adequacy ratios (CAP) 
than Large CBs.  Our results support the ninth hypothesis that states a different 
evolution of Small and Large CBs. 
 
3. Cross-Banks variation 
 
To controll for individual IB caracteristic in assessing the differences across 
different bank types, we therefore run the following regression: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜸𝒊𝑰𝑩𝒊 + 𝜇𝑡𝑌𝑡 + 𝜇iBi + 𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋𝐷2008 + 𝑢i𝑡   (3) 
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where  
IB is an Islamic Bank indicator, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and 
stability of bank i, in year t, 𝐵𝑖 are Bank-fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡 are year-fixed effects, 𝐷2008 is a dummy variable for GFC (taking the value one from year > 2008), 
and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error term.  
OLS results of regression (3) for each group of considered measures are given at 
Table 4 (see Appendix). We have two islamic banks : 39 ≡ AL Baraka and 52 ≡ 
Zitouna.. 
The results in Table 4 show a cross-bank variation in the differences between 
Islamic and conventional banks. Table 4 results suggest that AL Baraka Islamic 
bank has lower Return on equity (ROE) than others banks (significant at the 1% 
level), higher Return on assets (ROA) while there is no significant difference,  
higher (CTA) ratio, lower Cash to deposits (CTD) while there is no significant 
difference, higher Loans to assets (LTA) and Loans to deposits (LTD) ratios, 
higher Non-performing loans to gross loans (NPL) and higher Capital adequacy 
ratios (CAP) and lower Deposits to assets (DTA) ratios (significant at the 1% 
level) than others banks. These results suggest that AL Baraka bank is less 
profitable and more risker but more capitalized and more solvent than others 
banks. The results reveal also that Zitouna Islamic bank has higher Return on 
assets (ROA) and lower Return on equity (ROE) than others banks (significant at 
the 1% level), higher Cash to assets (CTA) ratios, lower Cash to deposits (CTD), 
lower Loans to assets (LTA) ratios, lower Loans to deposits (LTD) ratios, higher 
Deposits to assets (DTA) ratios (significant at the 1% level), higher Capital 
adequacy ratios (CAP) and higher Z-score than others banks. We find also that 
both Zitouna and AL Baraka Islamic bank have higher Loans loss reserves to 
gross loans (LLR) than others banks, while there are no significant differences. 
Across banks, Zitouna bank is less liquid, less riskier and less solvent, but more 
profitable, more capitalized and more stable. However, it may be possible that 
Zitouna’ shareholders are more willing to accept a lower ROE. These results are 
consistent with the eleventh hypothesis that Zitouna bank has different evolution 
than Al Baraka bank. 
 
 
4. Controlling for Market shares 
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Taking into account differences in Market share, we use additional 
specifications, including interacting the IB dummy with Hight Market share 
variable (Hshare). To do so, we split the sample all banks according to their 
Market share. Specifically, we split the sample into banks above the 50th 
percentile (high Market share banks) and banks below the 50th percentile (Low 
Market share banks). We use additional specifications, including interacting the 
IB dummy with high Market share dummy. We therefore run the following 
regression : 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 +   β 𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝜸 𝐇𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑰𝑩𝒊 + 𝜇𝑡𝑌𝑡 + 𝜇iBi + 𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋 𝐷2008 + 𝑢i𝑡   (4) 
where 𝐻𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐵 = HShare × IB, 
HShare = 1 if Market Share ≥ Median market share, 
Market share = Bank total assets /Country banks total assets * 100%, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and 
stability of bank i, in year t, 𝐵𝑖 are Bank-fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡 are year-fixed effects, 𝐼𝐵𝑖 is a dummy taking the value one for interest-free banks, 𝐷2008 is a dummy 
variable for GFC (taking the value one from year > 2008), and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
 OLS results of regressions (4) for each group of considered measures are given 
at Table 5 (see Appendix).  
The results in Table 5 show significant variation in the differences between 
conventional and Islamic banks across banks and years with different market 
shares of Islamic banks. One of the reasons why we observe the cross-banks 
variation in differences between conventional and Islamic banks might be 
different relative market shares of conventional and Islamic banks.  
 
The Panel A regressions of Table 5 show that IBs have relatively lower ROE 
(profitability) than CBs with a higher market share of IBs. While IBs have higher 
LTA ratios (credit risk) than CBs, this difference increases as the market share of 
IBs decreases (significant at the 1% level). We also find that IBs have higher LTD 
(credit risk) with a lower market share of IBs, lower LLR with a lower market 
share of IBs ratios and lower NPL with higher market share of IBs than CBs. We 
continue to find that IBs have higher CAP (capitalization) but lower Z-score 
(stability) than CBs although these differences do not vary significantly with the 
market share of IBs. 
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In summary, some of the cross-bank variation in the differences between Islamic 
and conventional banks, established in Table 5, can be explained with differences 
in market shares for IBs. 
 
Here, we control for bank size, age, growth and asset structure of banks, by 
including the fixed assets to assets (FFA) ratios and Off-balance sheet items to 
assets (OBSIA) ratios. 
The Panel B results suggest that the lower ROE (profitability) of IBs visa-vis CBs 
is driven by markets with lower market shares of IBs. While IBs have higher LTA 
ratios (credit risk) than CBs, this difference increases as the market share of IBs 
decreases (significant at the 1% level). We find also that IBs have higher LTD 
(credit risk) with a lower market share of IBs, lower DTA (insolvency risk) with 
a higher market share of IBs ratios and higher NPL than conventional ones. We 
continue to find that IBs have higher CAP (capitalization) but lower Z-score 
(stability) than CBs although these differences do not vary significantly with the 
market share of IBs. We confirm so the tenth hypothesis that high Share market 
IBs have different evolution than CBs. This result is not in line with finding of 
(Čihák & Hesse, 2010) that the market share of IBs does not have significant 
impact on the financial strength of other banks. 
 
5. During  and Post TUN Revolution 2011 
 
Taking into account GFC effect and time trend (long run effect) on IBs, We run 
the following regression: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 +   𝛽 𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝜸 𝑰𝑩𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟏𝒊 + 𝜇𝑡𝑌𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝐵𝑖 + 𝜇 𝐼𝐵𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (5) 
where 𝑰𝑩𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟏𝒊 =  IBi ×  𝑫𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟏,  IBTrendi= IBi × Trend, Trend = t,  𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, 
Insolvency, and stability of bank i, in year t, 𝐵𝑖 are Bank-fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡 are 
year-fixed effects, 𝐼𝐵𝑖 is a dummy taking the value one for interest-free banks, 𝐷2011 is a dummy variable for TUN revolution (taking the value one from year 
> 2011), and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
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OLS results of regressions (5) for each group of considered measures are given 
at Table 6 (see Appendix). 
Table 6 compares the relative performance of conventional and Islamic banks 
during and Post Tunisian Revolution 2011 to test whether one bank type is better 
positioned to political transition.  
 
The Table 6 results show lower ROE of IBs relative to CBs Post the Tunisian 
Revolution 2011. We do not find any significant difference between conventional 
and Islamic banks in their ROA, CTD, LTD, LLR or NPL. 
We find also that post Tunisian Revolution, there is no significant difference in 
terms of stability between IBs and CBs. However over the study period, IBs have 
lower insolvency risk and tend to be more capitalized and stable than CBs. 
 An explanation for this may be that the customers’ preference to Islamic banking 
products post Tunisian Revolution appears significant and it is essentially based 
on a motivation of compliance with the Islamic religion principles.  
 Conclusion 
 
This paper provides a comparison between Tunisian Islamic and conventional 
banks on the basis of financial characteristics, in particular, profitability, liquidity, 
capitalization, stability, insolvency risks. The comparison analysis between 
interest-free banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs) of bank specific factors 
indicates that there are differences between Islamic and conventional banks 
behaviour. Regression based Comparison analysis show that IBs are more 
profitable and more liquid than CBs. However, CB’asset contains more cash than 
its customer deposit compared to IB. IBs carry higher credit risk compared to 
CBs. Results show also lower insolvency risk in CBs. IBs are more capitalized 
and stable than CBs. 
 
Comparing Islamic and Conventional Banks cross different Size groups, we find 
that Large IBs are more profitable, more capitalized and riskier than small IBs. 
Small IBs have also lower Z-score than Large IBs. We conclude that the stability 
of IBs can be attributed to size effect (Large IBs). Moreover, the stability of large 
IBs is driven by higher capitalization and liquidity. Small CBs behave inversely 
to Small IB. Small CBs are more profitable more capitalized and riskier than 
Large CBs. Result reveals lower insolvency risk in Large CBs.   
 
Moreover, results suggest that AL Baraka bank is less profitable and more riskier 
but more solvent than others banks.  Across banks, Zitouna bank is less liquid, 
less riskier and less solvent, but more profitable and more stable. However, it may 
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be possible that Zitouna’ shareholders are more willing to accept a lower ROE. 
Both banks are more than others Tunisian banks. 
 
We confirm also the hypothesis that high Share market IBs have different 
evolution than CBs. Moreover, we find that post Tunisian Revolution, there is no 
significant difference in terms of stability between IBs and CBs. However over 
the study period, IBs have lower insolvency risk and tend to be more capitalized 
and stable than CBs. 
 
A future study based on a larger sample and more advanced statistical tools 
covering all financial ratios of Tunisia would have allowed us a more powerful 
analysis.  
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Appendix: Tables 
List of banks 
Table A 1 : List of banks (with code) 
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
 40 Banque Internt Arabe Tunisie,  
 41 Banque Nationale Agricole,  
 42 Société Tunisienne de Bank,  
 43 Amen Bank,  
 44 Banque de l'Habitat,  
 45 Attijari Bank,  
 46 Arab Tunisian Bank,  
 47 Banque de Tunisie,  
 48 Union Internl de Banque,  
 49 Union Bancaire  Comrce et l'Industrie, 
 50 North Africa International Bank – NAIB,  
 51 Arab Banking Corporation – Tunisie,  
 53 Alubaf International Bank, 
 54 Banque Franco-Tunisienne,  
 
 39 Albaraka Bank Tunisia,  
 52 Banque Zitouna 
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Table 2 : Comparing Islamic and conventional banks – controlling for bank 
characteristics –.Equation (1). 
  Profitability  Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets 
ROA    
Return on 
equity 
ROE    
Cash to assets 
CTA    
Cash to 
deposits 
CTD   
Loans to 
assets LTA    
Loans to 
deposits 
LTD    
IB .01376627*** -.58432157*** .03662932*   -.23781948*  .23223847*** .19257078*** 
Size -.03527788*** 1.2384483*** -.086113*** .47951138*  -.0114741    .04957367    
AGE -.00209698*** .15092366*** -.00991444*** .0535007*  -.0004246    -.02719005*** 
Growth .05490433*** -.70845293*** .41417362    .08844247   .07533632    .00948226    
FAA -.20820837**  -.15319926    -.40796743    -1.1576888   1.6046999    8.8019262*** 
OBSIA .00432914    -.10205214    .04823151    .04380547   -.02036791    .10438804    
_cons .13844752*** -5.7414665*** .38162836*** -2.1498206*  .28459784    .8413741*** 
N 68    68    68    65   62    62    
R2 .91172526    .98542583    .57572664    .5673408   .85519381    .8668945    
 Credit risk  Regulatory risk Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss reserves 
to gross loans  
LLR    
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL   
Capital adequacy 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets 
DTA    
Zscore    
IB .31458575    3.3032255*  .29304455*** .16931071**  74.348892*** 
Size .05912734    4.4462299** -.05273204*** .01818732    -25.631379*** 
AGE .01751645*   -.12172771*  .00905375**  .01574695*** .26602718    
Growth .12053668    -3.3565102*  .17962739    .3804908    34.728164*** 
FAA -.35767576    -13.148361   -1.4318501    1.3849846    -317.68024**  
OBSIA .08869682    -.56942943   .04964595    -.16333564*   10.074623    
Trend .00410145    .03439549** .00252759*** .00335917*** .61875713*** 
_cons -2.3298587    -24.097995** -1.1639017*** -1.8019052*** -254.31614*** 
N 44    29   68    68    68    
R2 .85092168    .8598928   .82648402    .9007615    .96218668    
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
Table 3 :  Comparing Islamic and Conventional Banks cross different Size 
groups. (large vs small) –.Equation (2).  
  Profitability  Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets 
ROA    
Return on 
equity 
ROE    
Cash to assets 
CTA    
Cash to 
deposits 
CTD   
Loans to 
assets LTA    
Loans to 
deposits 
LTD    
Small_IB -.17896147*** 7.5961804*** -.47618121*   3.0916533* -3.0191001*** -2.5034201*** 
Small_CB .09817607    -2.2305608*** .10103594    -1.2285474* 2.861374*** 1.7807591*   
size -.03527788*** 1.2384483*** -.086113*** .47951138* -.0114741    .04957367    
AGE .00478615*   -.14123713*** .00840022    -.06540904* .11569463*** .06909534**  
Growth .05490433*** -.70845293*** .41417362    .08844247  .07533632    .00948226    
FAA -.20820837**  -.15319926    -.40796743    -1.1576888  1.6046999    8.8019262*** 
OBSIA .00432914    -.10205214    .04823151    .04380547  -.02036791    .10438804    
_cons .07468712    -4.9717096*** .37216572    -1.5158219* -1.9961799*** -.45795806    
N 68    68    68    65  62    62    
R2 .91172526    .98542583    .57572664    .5673408  .85519381    .8668945    
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 Credit risk  Regulatory  risk Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss reserves 
to gross loans  
LLR    
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL   
Capital adequacy 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets 
DTA    
Zscore    
Small_IB -.4230636    (omitted)    -.3940944*** -.22769371**  -99.986441*** 
Small_CB .70965511**  3.4325529*   . 37319363**  .60852052*** -8.978901    
size .05912734    4.4462299**  -.05273204*** .01818732    -25.631379*** 
AGE .02294034*** -.06477555    .01410624**  .0186661*** 1.5479046**  
Growth .12053668    -3.3565102*   .17962739    .3804908    34.728164*** 
FAA -.35767576    -13.148361    -1.4318501    1.3849846    -317.68024**  
OBSIA .08869682    -.56942943    .04964595    -.16333564*   10.074623    
Trend .00193189*** .01161462*** .0005066**  .00219151*** .10600616*** 
_cons -1.5978432    -16.834931**  -.1941429    -1.6345156*** 95.385786*** 
N 44    29    68    68    68    
R2 .85092168    .8598928    .82648402    .9007615    .96218668    
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
Table 4: Comparing Islamic and conventional banks, testing for cross-Banks 
variation. (2 banques islamiques) –.Equation (3). 
  Profitability  Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets 
ROA    
Return on 
equity 
ROE    
Cash to assets 
CTA    
Cash to 
deposits 
CTD   
Loans to 
assets LTA    
Loans to 
deposits 
LTD    
Bank                       
39 AL Baraka .00538564    -.27593704*** .02304106    -.11197916  .37130652*** .27937746*** 
52 Zitouna    .11433377*** -4.2849359*** .19968854**  -1.7479033* -1.4365781*** -.84910945**  
size -.03527788*** 1.2384483*** -.086113*** .47951138* -.0114741    .04957367    
AGE .00209333**  -.00326861    -.00312031    -.00941946  -.06995863*** -.07059339*** 
Growth .05490433*** -.70845293*** .41417362    .08844247  .07533632    .00948226    
FAA -.20820837**  -.15319926    -.40796743    -1.1576888  1.6046999    8.8019262*** 
OBSIA .00432914    -.10205214    .04823151    .04380547  -.02036791    .10438804    
_cons .05045096*** -2.5034289*** .23895154*** -.82849727  1.7448123*** 1.7528443*** 
N 68    68    68    65  62    62    
R2 .91172526    .98542583    .57572664    .5673408  .85519381    .8668945    
 Credit risk  Regulatory risk Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss reserves 
to gross loans  
LLR    
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL   
Capital adequacy 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets 
DTA    
Zscore    
Bank                    
39 AL Baraka .26339443    3.3032255*  .2732494**  -.69145507*** -14.033205    
52 Zitouna    .33223793       .29987046*** .4661265*** 104.82548*** 
Size .05912734    4.4462299** -.05273204*** .01818732    -25.631379*** 
AGE .01839906**  -.12172771*  .00939504**  .03058774*** 1.7898564*** 
Growth .12053668    -3.3565102*  .17962739    .3804908    34.728164*** 
FAA -.35767576    -13.148361   -1.4318501    1.3849846    -317.68024**  
OBSIA .08869682    -.56942943   .04964595    -.16333564*   10.074623    
Trend .00374841**  .03439549** .00239108**  -.00257714**  .00922543    
_cons -2.1641047    -24.097995** -1.0998064*   .98519504    31.858995    
N 44    29   68    68    68    
R2 .85092168    .8598928   .82648402    .9007615    .96218668    
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
Table 5 : Comparing Islamic and conventional banks – controlling for market 
shares–.Equation (4).  
Panel A 
  Profitability  Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets 
ROA    
Return on 
equity 
ROE    
Cash to assets 
CTA    
Cash to 
deposits 
CTD   
Loans to 
assets LTA    
Loans to 
deposits 
LTD    
IB .14228643    -.45065283*   -.05294027   -.16391412   .39110442*** .47739782*** 
HIBShare .61019215*** 6.181197*** -.0142166   -.34728704   -11.544664*** -36.245484*** 
_cons -.11029212    .09290174    .07492932   .15458922   .13771639*** .16535186**  
N 122    122    122   118   113    113    
R2 .32675916    .53111333    .29891923   .26302029   .80274109    .77412663    
F 5.0879173    4.7189396    28.840994   13.556027   269.89742    3867.8387    
 Credit risk  Regulatory risk Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss reserves 
to gross loans  
LLR    
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL   
Capital adequacy 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets 
DTA    
Zscore    
IB -4.1892988*** -10.397839*** .42085497**  2.3327487 -291.15394*** 
HIBShare -7.6076944*** 21.074638*** -1.1915991    .33701545 10.092945    
Trend -.02853792*** -.0695206***     .01848427 -2.0076828*** 
_cons 15.124593*** 36.992419*** -.20605471    -9.3449261 1064.0627*** 
N 69    38    122    122 122    
R2 .82770739    .71797384    .57526069    .67256012 .90188246    
F .    .    11.025971    21.290304 144.48373    
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
Panel B 
  Profitability  Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets 
ROA    
Return on 
equity 
ROE    
Cash to assets 
CTA    
Cash to 
deposits 
CTD   
Loans to 
assets LTA    
Loans to 
deposits 
LTD    
IB .00538564    -.27593704*** .02304106    -.11197916   .37130652*** .27937746*** 
HIBShare .27582994*** -10.149802*** .44722811*   -4.1417588** -4.5771205*** -2.8570521*** 
Size -.03527788*** 1.2384483*** -.086113*** .47951138*  -.0114741    .04957367    
AGE .00209333**  -.00326861    -.00312031    -.00941946   -.06995863*** -.07059339*** 
Growth .05490433*** -.70845293*** .41417362    .08844247   .07533632    .00948226    
FAA -.20820837**  -.15319926    -.40796743    -1.1576888   1.6046999    8.8019262*** 
OBSIA .00432914    -.10205214    .04823151    .04380547   -.02036791    .10438804    
_cons .05045096*** -2.5034289*** .23895154*** -.82849727   1.7448123*** 1.7528443*** 
N 68    68    68    65   62    62    
R2 .91172526    .98542583    .57572664    .5673408   .85519381    .8668945    
 Credit risk  Regulatory risk Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss reserves 
to gross loans  
LLR    
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL   
Capital adequacy 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets 
DTA    
Zscore    
IB .26339443    3.3032255*  .2732494**  -.69145507*** -14.033205    
HIBShare .17429487    (omitted)   .06739801    2.9307127*** 300.92104*** 
Size .05912734    4.4462299** -.05273204*** .01818732    -25.631379*** 
AGE .01839906**  -.12172771*  .00939504**  .03058774*** 1.7898564*** 
Growth .12053668    -3.3565102*  .17962739    .3804908    34.728164*** 
FAA -.35767576    -13.148361   -1.4318501    1.3849846    -317.68024**  
OBSIA .08869682    -.56942943   .04964595    -.16333564*   10.074623    
Trend .00374841**  .03439549** .00239108**  -.00257714**  .00922543    
_cons -2.1641047    -24.097995** -1.0998064*   .98519504    31.858995    
N 44    29   68    68    68    
R2 .85092168    .8598928   .82648402    .9007615    .96218668    
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
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Table 6 : Comparing Islamic and conventional banks during  and Post TUN 
Revolution 2011–.Equation (5). 
       
  Profitability  Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets 
ROA    
Return on 
equity 
ROE    
Cash to assets 
CTA    
Cash to 
deposits 
CTD   
Loans to 
assets LTA    
Loans to 
deposits 
LTD    
IB -.4874208   -2.7069843    -2.2733492   -3.3213903   -14.529619*   -16.068414   
IB*2011 .00290249   -4.545168*** 1.3492151** (omitted)   -.58356448    -1.1075043   
IB*Trend .001266   .00712124    .00531932   .00784565   .03758375*   .04158041   
Size -.03228188   -.19879422    .35268502*  .45134848*  -.13008476    -.22924553   
AGE .00468771   .0267412    .06617794*  .0903295** .17865979*   .15438406   
Growth .05419417*  .35689201    .09775564   .11840647   .1858551    .24129437   
FAA -.20775333** -.21803137    -.38630232   -1.1570346   1.3875083    8.5172091** 
OBSIA .00461313   -.03459674    .03012108   .04768183   -.01073261    .11878026   
_cons -.01006993   -.07269745    -2.1488334*  -2.86119** -3.2135897    -2.3668583   
N 68   68    68   65   62    62   
R2 .91308646   .99107928    .63676038   .57032318   .85919634    .86887103   
      
 Credit risk  Regulatory risk Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss reserves 
to gross loans  
LLR    
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL   
Capital adequacy 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets 
DTA    
Zscore    
IB .53909752   29.231427  -4.679827** -14.185883*** -589.56652*   
IB*2011 -.11247599   (omitted)  -.79618625*  -1.0240437    39.216015    
IB*Trend -.00047448   -.06643361  .0115398** .0311957*** 1.2989946*   
Size .06107324   4.6262797* -.28766182*  -.25722743    -11.00553    
AGE .01677479   -.12165354* .0212314** .06037447*** 2.9736986**  
Growth .11883339   -3.5152698* .36600431** .61982218**  25.504348    
FAA -.34857719   -9.894058  -1.4398561   1.3800114    -316.67796**  
OBSIA .08834662   -.56401441  .06411168   -.14052039*   9.8428126    
Trend .00439649   .03733257* -.00154993   -.01335351*   -.48995754    
_cons -2.4726792   -26.101396* 1.2119402   6.5794519**  236.78864    
N 44   29  68   68    68    
R2 .85092502   .86543715  .83768483   .91242768    .96319389    
 
